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Most models of social contagion take peer exposure to be a corollary of adoption, yet in many settings,
the visibility of one’s adoption behavior happens through a separate decision process. In online systems,
product designers can define how peer exposure mechanisms work: adoption behaviors can be shared in a
passive, automatic fashion, or occur through explicit, active sharing. The consequences of these mechanisms
are of substantial practical and theoretical interest: passive sharing may increase total peer exposure but
active sharing may expose higher quality products to peers who are more likely to adopt.
We examine selection effects in online sharing through a large-scale field experiment on Facebook that
randomizes whether or not adopters share Offers (coupons) in a passive manner. We derive and estimate
a joint discrete choice model of adopters’ sharing decisions and their peers’ adoption decisions. Our results
show that active sharing enables a selection effect that exposes peers who are more likely to adopt than the
population exposed under passive sharing. We decompose the selection effect into two distinct mechanisms:
active sharers expose peers to higher quality products, and the peers they share with are more likely to
adopt independently of product quality. Simulation results show that the user-level mechanism comprises
the bulk of the selection effect. The study’s findings are among the first to address downstream peer effects
induced by online sharing mechanisms, and can inform design in settings where a surplus of sharing could
be viewed as costly.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: J.4 [Social and Behavioral Sciences]: Economics
General Terms: Economics, Experimentation
Additional Key Words and Phrases: viral marketing; information diffusion; social advertising; econometrics
1. INTRODUCTION
Standard models of social contagion consider adoption decisions of agents in the presence
of social signals, but often take peer exposure to be a consequence of adoption [Bass 1969;
Granovetter 1978; Jackson and Yariv 2007; Schelling 1973]. This is natural for many situa-
tions where adoption creates a persistent signal that peers can observe; if an individual buys
a car, she will find it difficult to prevent her peers from knowing about her adoption. While
theory tends to conflate adoption and exposure, they reflect substantive design decisions in
practice. In online settings, developers and marketers may seek to increase their “virality”
by providing encouragements and incentives to spread their product or message to others.
The decision to adopt and peer exposure can range from perfectly correlated to completely
independent. Applications which implement passive sharing automatically broadcast users’
behaviors to their peers [Aral and Walker 2011]. Similarly, Liking a Page on Facebook
induces publicly visible connection that persists over time [Bakshy et al. 2012a]. However,
in other settings (e.g. browsing the Web), individuals must actively share their behaviors.
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In this paper, we examine the interaction between propogation and adoption. Exactly
how an individual’s adoption decision is linked to peer exposure can vary depending on
the medium and product or message being spread. The relationship can be modulated by
providing adopters with encouragements to share1 that may impact the diffusion process.
Developers can engineer features which encourage sharing or make peer exposure a more
reliable consequence of product adoption or use2, fulfilling the role that prestige and at-
tractiveness might play in offline goods and services [Veblen 2005]. In order to predict the
consequences of these strategies for product diffusion, it is important to understand how the
nature of a user’s decision to share may have an impact on her peers’ decisions to adopt.
We implement a large-scale field experiment on Facebook to measure the effect of sharing
interface on peer adoption, randomizing whether users of a coupon product share their
redemption behavior in an active or passive manner. Our results show that when adoption
is perfectly linked with sharing, exposed peers are less likely to adopt the product in turn.
The adoption effect we observe could be explained by either selection of influential adopters
and/or susceptible peers (dyad selection), or by selection of higher quality products. To
disentangle these effects, we derive a discrete choice model of the adoption and sharing
process and use Bayesian estimation techniques to fit the model to our experimental data.
We find strong evidence for dyad selection – peers of users who share in the active sharing
condition are more likely to adopt the products their peers share. We also find evidence
for selection on product quality, but the effect on overall adoption outcomes is small. The
major downstream effects of sharing regime are dominated by the selection of dyads.
We proceed as follows. In the first section we review relevant literature on information
diffusion in social networks and show how our work contributes to it. In the following
section, we derive an econometric model linking sharing with peer adoption in Section 3. We
then describe our empirical context and experimental design in Section 4. We summarize
our results and estimate the selection effects using the experimental data and model in
Section 5. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of our results and their implications in
Section 6.
2. RELATED WORK
Online social networks allow users to articulate their relationships to people, companies,
and products, and enable studies of diffusion processes in vivo across consumer behaviors,
including product recommendations [Leskovec et al. 2007], the adoption of social applica-
tions [Aral et al. 2009; Wei et al. 2010], and link re-sharing [Bakshy et al. 2011; Goel et al.
2012].
Recent studies are also beginning to analyze mechanisms of information transmission
and their causal interpretations. Since individuals form relationships with similar oth-
ers [McPherson et al. 2001], network autocorrelation does not necessarily imply that an
individuals influence their peers’ behaviors [Hill et al. 2006; Aral et al. 2009]. This problem
is exacerbated when the assumed exposure model omits backdoor paths which could plausi-
bly account for the correlations [Shalizi and Thomas 2011]. Even given perfect observability
of the network process and abundant behavioral data, latent homophily or confounding
factors could drive the assortativity in peer outcomes.
One of the most promising approaches to address these confounds in diffusion studies
is the use of randomized field experiments [Aral and Walker 2011; Aral and Walker 2012;
Bakshy et al. 2012a; Bakshy et al. 2012b]. However, experiments thus far either compare
1We use the term share because it broadly covers a range of diffusion phenomenon online, but we use it
to address any choice that increases the visibility of an individual’s adoption decision to others. In some
settings, this action can be seen as an endorsement or a form of conspicuous consumption [Veblen 2005].
2Passive sharing, where an action is automatically made visible to an individuals’ peers, can be seen as the
strongest possible encouragement to share, so that all users are equally as likely to share upon adoption.
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overall effects via different channels of influence, or focus on the direct effects of social
signals on individual behavior through a single mechanism. For example, Aral and Walker
[2011] showed that active personalized messaging is more effective in encouraging adoption
per message, while passive sharing generates greater total peer adoption in the network.
However, it is not clear whether these differences in adoption rates are due to greater
persuasiveness of the message format, differences in delivery3, or selection effects. Our work
elucidates the mechanism for this selection effect (e.g. selecting peers who are more likely to
adopt) by considering effects via single channel of communication and identical information
content.
An intriguing aspect of word-of-mouth diffusion is the idea that social networks could be
cleverly leveraged to increase the spread of desirable behaviors [Hill et al. 2006]. Much of the
research in this area approaches the problem via mathematical models that are analyzed
through proofs on a given graph structure or through simulation [Kempe et al. 2003; Aral
et al. 2011; Chierichetti et al. 2012]. Influence maximization has thus far been studied
through models that do not account network autocorrelation in susceptibility, or make a
distinction between adoption rates and the decision to share. Part of the goal of our work
is to shed light on how sharing decisions can affect downstream adoption to further the
development of such models.
3. THEORY: SELECTION MECHANISMS IN PRODUCT DIFFUSION
Word-of-mouth (WOM) marketing or so-called “viral” diffusion is a repeated process of
users adopting products and transmitting information about those products to their peers.
While most studies focus on economic aspects of the adoption decisions or patterns of
diffusion over the network, we examine propagation decisions and their selection effects on
peer adoption.
3.1. Selection mechanisms
We posit that the conditions under which an adopter decides to share a product has a
substantive impact the adoption rate of her peers. To see why, consider sharing to be a binary
choice for all adopters and consider two extreme cases: passive (automatic) sharing and
active (selective) sharing. In the former case, every adopter shares their adoption decision
with all their peers, and sharing can perform no selective role. In the latter, perhaps only
a small fraction of adopters share. This may happen, for instance, if sharing bears a cost
– such the time to send an email or the initiative to bring up a product in conversation.
To isolate selection, one can think of peers of sharers receiving identical signals indicating
that their peer has adopted the product, e.g. a structured signal such a Like, a “+1”, or a
check-in.
In a world where peers receive homogeneous signals – such as the aforementioned online
social signals – differences in adoption rates among peers of adopters in the two sharing
regimes must be caused by selection of some combination of sharer-peer-product groups
from different sample populations. There are at least three possible selection effects that
could alter peer adoption decisions when the sharing decision changes:
(1) Adopter selection: Adopters who share are more influential than non-sharers.
(2) Peer selection: Peers of sharers are more interested adopting the product than peers of
non-sharers.
(3) Product selection: Individuals share better products and decline to share worse ones.
All three selection mechanisms could be present if an individual has some pro-social or
financial motivation to share products that her peers are more likely to adopt. In this case,
3In the context of the authors’ study, active messages were always received by the alter, whereas passive
sharing could be aggregated or filtered, and therefore may not be as salient or seen by the alter.
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she may use her private information about her peers’ preferences to decide whether or not
to share. Product selection may be more salient if users gain utility from portraying an
association with prestigious brands or if users receive disutility from creating associations
that embarrass them [Akerlof and Kranton 2000].
The difference between adopter and peer selection is subtle and worthy of further discus-
sion. For example, a so-called “influential” may cause many peers to adopt merely because
her peers are easily influenced [Watts and Dodds 2007]. It is clearly difficult to define a
distinction between adopter and peer selection, and more difficult still to econometrically
identify the difference between them.4 Accordingly, we will use the term dyad selection to
refer to selection of adopter-peer pairs where peer adoption is more likely, regardless of
whether it is due to characteristics of the adopter, their peer, or the relationship between
them. Product selection will be used to refer to any selection effects which are observable
between products.
3.2. Model
We now develop an economic model that formalizes our hypotheses and the tradeoffs we
wish to describe.
3.2.1. Choice model. We index newly adopting individuals by i = 1, . . . , N and products by
k = 1, . . . ,K. We model the probability an individual makes her adoption visible (sik = 1)
or not (sik = 0) as a piecewise function depending on whether she is in the active sharing
condition, indicated by zi = 1.
sik =
{
1 : zi = 0
1 (µk + ik ≥ 0) : zi = 1
Here 1 is the indicator function and µk ∼ Normal(α, σ2µ) is the population average ran-
dom utility for sharing product k. The unobserved term ik ∼ Normal(0, σ2 ) represents
individual-specific factors that increase the utility of i sharing k with her peers. This could
include, for example, any utility she expects from sharing based on private information
about her peers’ preferences.
Individuals in the passive sharing condition live in a simple world: if they adopt, their
behavior is visible to their peers. Subjects in the active sharing condition will share if the
product itself is “shareable” enough – µk is sufficiently high – or if her idiosyncratic utility
ik from sharing is high enough. The first obvious result from this model is that sharing
for those in the active sharing condition is always less than in the passive condition. We
assume µk and ik are independent random variables. In an empirical context, µk would be
identified by variation in sharing rates between products.
Let yik ∈ {0, 1} represent the decision of a peer of i, the subject’s peer, to adopt product
k after observing i’s behavior. We model the peer adoption decision as the following discrete
choice:
yik = 1 (λk + νik ≥ 0) .
In this equation λk ∼ Normal(γ, σ2λ) is the product utility from adoption. νik ∼
Normal(0, σ2ν) is the unobserved utility from adoption that i’s peers receive for k. Note
that the peer either receives a signal about the product or they do not, they have no in-
formation about the individual’s treatment status zi
5. Peers are only eligible to make this
4One strategy for identifying adopter-specific influence requires repeated observation of different adopters
sending persuasive messages to members of the same population of peers. Since each adopter may have
different peers, it is difficult to design an experiment where peers are sampled from the same population.
5It is important to note that our experimental design isolates a pure selection effect because the messages
received by peers are the same regardless of the treatment status of sender.
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decision if sik = 1. We will now differentiate between product and dyad selection mech-
anisms, correlations across different utility components which link an individual’s sharing
decision with her peers’ adoption decisions. These mechanisms will only function if the
individual’s sharing decision occurs in the active sharing regime.
3.2.2. Selection on products. Sharing can act as a selection mechanism on product quality.
Assume that µk and λk are correlated random variables with correlation coefficient ρ, which
would be the case if the latent product quality, e.g. value, provides both sharing and adoption
utilities: [
µk
λk
]
∼ Normal
([
α
γ
]
,
[
σ2µ ρσµσλ
ρσµσλ σ
2
λ
])
.
The correlation coefficient ρ may be interepreted as a measure of product selection and
we hypothesize that ρ > 0: products that are more likely to be shared are also more likely to
be adopted, independently of dyadic preferences. The consequence of this hypothesis is that
exposed peers decide whether to adopt products with a higher mean utility for adoption. To
see how, let φ and Φ be the standard normal density and distribution functions respectively,
and E be the expectation operator. When adopters in the active sharing world share, the
conditional distribution of λk for her peers’ adoption decisions has a higher expected value:
E [λk|µk ≥ −ik] = γ + σλρ
φ
(
− ikσµ
)
1− Φ
(
− ikσµ
) ≥ γ. (1)
In an empirical context, ρ can be identified by the correlation in sharing and adoption
rates between products.
3.2.3. Selection on dyads. An individual who actively shares may be more likely to generate
adoptions from her peers than those who do not. This could be because the individual
is influential or her peers are susceptible to this particular product (e.g. the individual
recommends a product to peers who are likely adopters).6
As in the Heckman [1979] model of sample selection bias, we will assume that our un-
observed utility components ik and νik are distributed bivariate normal with correlation
coefficient ψ: [
ik
νik
]
∼ Normal
([
0
0
]
,
[
σ2 ψσσν
ψσσν σ
2
ν
])
.
ψ is our measure of dyad selection and we hypothesize that ψ > 0: an individual is more
likely to share when her peers are more likely to adopt the product, independent of the
product quality. As in the product selection mechanism, the effect is driven by an increase
in the mean of the distribution of the peer’s idiosyncratic utility conditional on individual
choosing to share:
E [νik|ik ≥ −µk] = σνψ
φ
(
−µkσν
)
1− Φ
(
−µkσν
) ≥ 0. (2)
6This type of selection mechanism through correlated unobservable variables is a contribution of Heckman
[1979], which uses the example of researchers only observing the market wages of individuals who choose
to enter the labor market. Here we only observe the adoption decisions of users whose peers chose to make
their adoptions visible.
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When ψ > 0, those who actively share will have peers who are more interested in adopting
the product. In other words, passive sharing causes the individual to spread the product
even when she knows her peers may not be likely to adopt.
If ρ is identified through repeated observations of sharing and adoption behavior of prod-
ucts, then the correlation in individual specific utilities ψ can be identified by exogenously
assigning the individual to active and passive sharing interfaces. By assumption, peers of
adopters in the passive condition have E[νik] = 0, while peers of adopters in the active condi-
tion have idiosyncratic adoption utilities with conditional expectation, E[νik|ik > −µk] > 0.
This difference, and therefore ψ, can be identified by variation in adoption rates within
products and across peers of adopters in randomly assigned sharing interfaces.
If either of our two selection hypotheses are confirmed (i.e. ρ > 0 or ψ > 0), peers of
adopters who passively share will have a lower probability of adoption than peers of adopters
who actively share.
4. EXPERIMENT
We conducted a field experiment on Facebook to compare selection mechanisms present
in active and passive sharing regimes using Facebook Offers, a marketing product that
allows businesses to share discounts with customers by posting an Offers to their Facebook
Pages. Offers are similar to coupons or discounts available through sites like Groupon or
LivingSocial. When a user claims (adopts) an Offer, she receives an email which must either
be shown at the businesses’ physical location to get the discount, or can be used to receive
a discount in an online store. Simultaneously, those who share passively7 share their claim
activity with their peers (friends).
Offers are distributed via Facebook’s News Feed. The News Feed is the primary means
for users to consume stories about friends’ activities, such as status updates from friends,
or from Pages, which represent celebrities, businesses, and other organizations. Thus, there
are two ways that a user may receive an Offer. First, the subscribers of a Page receive stories
directly from the Page presenting the Offer (Figure 1a). Second, a user may be exposed to
the Offer via a friend whose action was made visible after adopting it (Figure 1b,c). These
two modes of diffusion correspond to having a single “big seed” (or broadcast node) [Watts
et al. 2007] which initially spreads the Offer, after which point cascading effects may occur.
Our empirical context provides several advantages over other settings. First, we can ob-
serve the diffusion of a large sample of comparable units, so our analyses do not suffer
from survivor bias (i.e. we observe even the unsuccessful cascades). Second, the behaviors
we study (claiming Offers) provide users with valuable incentives, are low cost, and are
expressly intended by marketers to achieve widespread distribution. Third, many Offers
receive substantial distribution and many adoptions, so we can observe many distinct users
interact with the same Offer, which is crucial to our identification strategy. Finally, we can
plausibly observe almost all interactions between users and Offers because very little Offer
transmission occurs outside of Facebook.
4.1. Experimental design
1.2 million users were randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions – the active
or passive sharing conditions – with equal probability at the time of adoption. That is, after
subjects claimed an Offer (adopted) on a mobile device, they would either share their Offer
redemption passively (Figure 2a), or were given a button that prompted the user to share
their claim action with others (Figure 2b). For each Offer, we record an impression event
each time a user sees the Offer in their News Feed (Figure 1) and if she claims (adopts) the
Offer. We also record whether she shared the Offer after adopting. In the following analyses,
7This is the default behavior for many activities on Facebook such as Liking a Page.
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(a) (b)
(c)
Fig. 1: A story for (a) a Page posting a new Offer on a mobile web browser and (b) a friend
claiming (adopting) an Offer on the Facebook iPhone application (c) a friend claiming an Offer on
the dekstop interface.
we use this data and consider Offers that were claimed by at least 25 users during a two
month period in 2012.
We examine downstream effects of the sharing interface by measuring the subsequent
behavior of peers who were exposed to subjects’ adoption activity. It is important to note
that peers who see the activity of subjects who share under the passive sharing condition
are different than those who share in the active condition. This introduces a selection effect
that shapes the population of exposed peers, and this effect is what we intend to measure.
4.2. Interference
The experimental treatment – a change in the mobile sharing interface – is applied to
adopters, but we measure the adoption outcomes of their peers. This approach can lead to
interference if peers are exposed through multiple adopters (Figure 3), and is problematic
for two reasons. First, the status of a peer is no longer well defined if she is exposed by
subjects in different conditions. Second, even if a peer is exposed through multiple adopters
with the same treatment, she may not be comparable to a user who is exposed through
only one. Multiply-exposed individuals may have higher adoption rates due to increased
homophily, multiple simultaneous social cues [Bakshy et al. 2012a] or multiple exposures
over time [Centola 2010].
Because passive sharing may increase the number of multiply-exposed peers, interference
can confound our ability to identify the selection effects we wish to estimate. Therefore our
analysis only considers the peers who are exposed via a single adopter’s sharing action8.
8While we find effects from multiple exposures to be interesting, modeling these processes is beyond the
scope of this paper.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 2: Mobile interface presented to subjects after adoption for the (a) active and (b) passive
sharing conditions.
Apassive
   
Apassive
   
Aactive
 
Aactive
 
P1,0 P2,0 P1,1 P0,2 P0,1
Fig. 3: An illustration of potential interference patterns in our experiment. The subscripts for each
exposed peer (P ) denotes the number of adopters (A) in the passive and active condition who
had exposed them to an Offer. Our analysis only considers peers of type P0,1 and P1,0, omitting
those exposed via more than one adopter (e.g. peers in the dotted box) in order to isolate selection
effects. These two types constitute approximately 90% of exposed peers.
This preserves the vast majority (approximately 90%) of exposed peers while simplifying
interpretation of the results.
5. RESULTS
We present our results through descriptive analysis and modeling. The first subsection pro-
vides a basic overview of the experimental data. In the following two subsections, we present
results from reduced-form models which examine subjects’ sharing decisions and peers’
adoption decisions separately. We focus on separating variation in sharing and adoption
outcomes into variation in Offer-specific effects and idiosyncratic user effects. In the fourth
subsection, we present estimates from the joint decision model introduced in Section 3.2 to
link the two models in a coherent system which can identify the correlation parameters we
are interested in, allowing us to distinguish between product and dyad selection effects.
5.1. Descriptive statistics
Table I shows summary results from the direct effect of the experiment. Approximately
the same number of subjects were exposed to each sharing interface, and subjects in each
condition were exposed via approximately the same number of distinct Offers. While all
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Active Passive
Subjects 577,933 573,113
Distinct Offers 23,102 23,251
Proportion shared 0.23 1.00
Table I: Summary of statistics for direct effects on subjects’ sharing behavior in the active and
passive sharing conditions.
Active Passive
Mean friends exposed 59.17 66.62
Median friends exposed 41 46
Number of adoptions 20,591 87,686
Adoption rate 0.0050 0.0045
Adoptions per subject 0.036 0.153
Adoptions per sharer 0.157 0.154
Table II: Summary statistics for subjects’ exposed peers in the active and passive sharing conditions.
users in the passive condition shared, approximately one in five subjects in the active sharing
condition shared the Offer with their peers.
After a subject shares an Offer, a story showing that the subject claimed the Offer was
eligible to appear in her peers’ News Feeds. Table II provides descriptive statistics about
how many peers were exposed to this story, as well as their subsequent adoption decisions.9
The mean and median number of exposed peers is slightly higher for sharing subjects in
the passive sharing condition compared to those in the active condition. Figure 4 shows
the distribution of the number of exposed peers by treatment condition. Here, we can see
that active sharing shifts the distribution toward individuals who expose fewer friends to
Offers. This effect is likely caused by selection on users who have fewer or or less active
peers. The result is fewer social exposures to the Offers from both less sharing as well as
smaller number of exposures per sharing user.
Peers who are reached via active sharing are more responsive on average with about a 10%
increase in the probability of adoption10 (95% confidence interval [1.063, 1.134]). However,
the low sharing rate for subjects in the active condition means that it is about 4.3 times
more effective to enable passive sharing as measured by aggregate peer adoptions.
Figure 5 provides an intuition for one of the mechanisms underlying selection effects in
sharing decisions. Adoption rate of peers varies according to whether the the alter was
exposed as a member of a large group of exposed peers of the individual or a small group.
Furthermore, the variability in adoption rate is greater for those who expose fewer peers.
5.2. Modeling variation in sharing behaviors
We first report the results for those in the active sharing condition. The share rate is
approximately 23% and is very precisely estimated. We are interested in the extent to
which Offer-level effects are driving sharing decisions by users. If there is little variability
between Offers and most of the variation occurs at the dyad level, then it will not be possible
9Recall from Section 4.2 that we only consider the subpopulation of exposed peers who were exposed the
Offer via a single friend.
10All confidence intervals reported in this section use the multiway bootstrap [Owen and Eckles 2012] with
500 replicates clustered by subjects and Offers. This bootstrap is expected to be accurate even in situations
where treatment effects are expected to vary with both subjects and items [Bakshy and Eckles 2013].
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Fig. 4: The empirical cumulative distribution function for the number of exposed peers for each
sharing subject by treatment condition. For clarity in comparison, the x-axis is truncated at the
90% percentile of the distribution. The empirical distributions show sharers in the passive condition
usually expose more of their peers.
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Fig. 5: Average adoption rate of sharing subjects’ peers, broken down by quintiles of the total
number of exposed peers. Error bars show the 95% confidence intervals.
for the product selection mechanism to function. To see why, assume there is no Offer-level
variation in share rates. Then Offer characteristics do not affect sharing at all and the set
of shared Offers will be sampled from the same distribution as the unshared Offers.
We estimate a random effects probit model,
Pr(sik = 1|µk) = Φ(µk + ik),
in order to estimate σ2µ. To identify the parameters in the probit model, we let σ
2
 =
1. Table III contains the model parameter estimates we obtain. The estimated intraclass
correlation coefficient is
σ2µ
σ2µ+σ
2

= 0.064, indicating that the Offer-level random effects do
not explain much additional variance in the sharing model. This implies that the product
selection mechanism is likely to be weak.
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Parameter Estimate
α −0.812∗
(0.005)
σµ 0.262
Log-likelihood -303,070
Groups 23,102
N 577,933
Table III: Maximum likelihood parameter estimates for probit regression predicting share rate with
random effects at the Offer level. The estimated mean of µk is α, which is an estimate of average
sharing utility. The variance of the random effects at the Offer level µk is small compared to the
total variance. * denotes significance at the 0.001 level.
5.3. Effect of passive sharing on downstream adoption
In this section, we estimate an average treatment effect of active sharing on peer adoption
rates. For each subject who shares – either because they were in the passive sharing condition
or they chose to share in the active sharing condition – we measure two aggregate outcomes
of the subjects’ peers: exposures and adoptions.
We define the number of peer exposures nik for user i and Offer k to be the number of
unique peers who saw a story in News Feed about the subject claiming the Offer. We only
count exposures which were unique, meaning that the alter must not have seen the Offer
through any other user’s adoption. We count a peer as exposed just once regardless of how
many impressions of claim story the user may have been served in her News Feed.
We define number of peer adoptions, aik =
∑nik
j=1 yijk, as a count of the number of peer
exposures which generated an adoption. We assume that nik is exogenous, since it depends
on the subject and her peers’ characteristics and Facebook usage behavior. Recall that zi
represents the exogenous (experimental) manipulation of the subject’s sharing interface and
is equal to 1 in for users in the active sharing condition.
Pr(aik = L|nik) = Binomial (nik,Φ(βzi + λk + νik)) ,
where β represents the average selection effect on the subject’s peers. As in the last
section, we ignore the correlations between the unobserved parameters. We report parameter
estimates for the regression model in Table IV. The coefficient β, measures all selection
effects, is positive and significant, and therefore confirms our hypothesis that active sharing
will increase the probability that an subject’s peers will adopt the product. The magnitude
of β corresponds to about a 7% marginal increase in the relative risk of adoption for peers
of users who share in the passive condition (95% confidence interval: [1.050, 1.089]).
As in the sharing model, we have assumed σ2ν = 1 in order to identify the other parameters.
We can compute the intraclass correlation coefficient for adoption,
σ2λ
σ2λ+σ
2
ν
= 0.029. This is
low, indicating that product quality does not explain a large amount of the variance in
adoption outcomes.
5.4. Joint decision model
The structural model we specified in Section 3.2 unifies the regression models in the pre-
vious two sections by accounting for the correlations between the unobserved parameters.
We assumed a correlation structure which accommodates two mechanisms for individual’s
sharing decision to impact her peers’ adoption decisions, obviating the need for the β pa-
rameter in the adoption model. Estimating the joint model allows us to understand the
relative contribution of each of the selection effects.
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Parameter Estimate
γ −2.742∗
(0.004)
β 0.022∗
(0.003)
σλ 0.172
Log-likelihood -151,521
Groups 25,726
N 702,090
Table IV: Maximum likelihood parameter estimates for binomial regression predicting the number
of adopting alters with random effects at the Offer level. γ is the mean of the random effect λk,
while β represents a reduced form measure of total selection effect. * denotes significance at the
0.001 level.
Our setup is similar to the simultaneous discrete-choice models with interdependent pref-
erences considered in Yang et al. [2006], motivating a similar estimation procedure using
Bayesian methods. Bayesian estimation is ideal for this setting because it allows us to flex-
ibly perform inference on the correlation parameters ρ and ψ at the cost of parametric
assumptions.
We use non-informative priors on all parameters and run Markov-chain Monte Carlo
simulations to estimate their posterior distributions given the observed data. Due to the
scale of our data, we used an efficient Hamiltonian Monte Carlo sampler [Hoffman and
Gelman 2012] and computed our results using a state-of-the-art Bayesian model compiler
[Stan Development Team 2013]. We simulated three Markov chains for 2,000 iterations,
discarding the first 1,000 iterations for “burn-in.” We then used the last 1,000 draws for
estimation. We evaluated convergence by computing a potential scale reduction factor for
each estimated parameter in the model [Gelman and Rubin 1992].
Parameter Mean 2.5% Median 97.5%
Mean product sharing utility α -0.813 -0.821 -0.813 -0.804
Mean product adoption utility γ -2.739 -2.748 -2.739 -2.730
Std. dev. of product sharing utility σµ 0.267 0.258 0.267 0.279
Std. dev. of product adoption utility σλ 0.172 0.165 0.173 0.179
Product-level correlation coefficient ρ 0.174 0.102 0.176 0.238
Dyad-selection correlation coefficient ψ 0.025 0.019 0.025 0.032
Table V: HMC posterior mean, median, and 95% credible interval estimates for the parameters of
the joint structural model of sharing and adoption specified in Section 3.2. Estimates for ρ and ψ
are positive and significant, providing evidence for both product- and dyad-selection effects.
We estimate three main types of parameters in the model (Table V). First, there are
mean sharing and adoption utilities, α and γ, which rationalize the average rates of sharing
and adoption. Second, there are correlations between the unobserved utilities at the product
level, ρ, and at the dyad level, ψ. Third, we estimate the standard deviations of the zero-
mean product-level utilities, σµ and σλ.
Note that as in the regression models, σ and σν are fixed at 1 in order to identify the
other parameters of the model. This is a typical assumption in this modeling situation where
we have no absolute utility scale.
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We find evidence for both types of selection effects that we hypothesized, ρ > 0 and
ψ > 0, indicating that in the active sharing interface, users who shared shared Offers which
were more likely to be adopted and seen by peers who were more likely to adopt them.11
It is worth pointing out that our estimates of α, γ, and the variances of the random effects
σ2µ and σ
2
λ are extremely close to the reduced-form models of the previous section. We have
essentially replaced β with structural correlation parameters which allow us to distinguish
between two mechanisms. But which of these mechanisms is more important?
Our estimate for ρ is substantially larger than our estimate for ψ, which could be in-
terpreted as evidence for the relative importance of product selection effects. However, we
must consider that the distributions of the Offer-level and dyad-level effects are different
in scale. This warrants further analysis of the interaction between correlations and effect
scales.
With posterior distributions for parameters in hand, we can use our model to decom-
pose the treatment effect into product and peer selection through simulation. Recall the
relative risk of peer adoption for active versus passive sharing had 95% confidence interval
[1.063, 1.134], which is measured by
RR =
Pr(yik = 1|zi = 1, sik = 1)
Pr(yik = 1|zi = 0) .
The effect of zi works through two exhaustive mechanisms. First it changes ρ from 0
to our estimate ρˆ > 0, enabling selection on product quality. Second, it changes ψ from 0
to our estimate ψˆ > 0, enabling selection on dyads. We can simulate relative risk under
counterfactuals scenarios where only one of the two mechanisms is enabled:
RRproduct =
Pr(yik = 1|sik = 1, ρ = ρˆ, ψ = 0)
Pr(yik = 1|sik = 0) ;
RRdyad =
Pr(yik = 1|ρ = 0, ψ = ψˆ)
Pr(yik = 1|sik = 0 ).
To compute these counterfactual relative risks, we simulate sharing behavior and subse-
quent adoption rates by drawing from our posterior parameter distributions. For RRproduct
we set ψ = 0 and then draw (ik, νik) pairs as independent random variables. For RRdyad
we set ρ = 0 and then draw independent (µk, λk) pairs. We then compute empirical rela-
tive risks over 500 generated sample populations and compute means and 95% confidence
intervals for selection effects under each counterfactual scenario.
The results of this procedure are shown in Figure 6. We can see that disabling the prod-
uct selection, leaving dyad selection only, retains most of the total selection effect in our
simulations. In comparison, the product selection effect is weaker. Thus, despite the high
correlation in Offer sharing and adoption utilities, their relatively low importance in the
explaining the variance of these decisions limits the product selection effect.
6. DISCUSSION
We have presented a theoretical result and supporting evidence that encouraging so-called
“virality” decreases the efficiency of marketing messages in social networks. Our study
is the first to identify the interaction between adoption and propagation decisions. This
relationship is important because peers of users who choose to share, and the products they
share, are potentially different than the peers of users and products shared by the general
11Recall from Section 3.2.3 that one cannot distinguish between adopter and peer selection mechanisms in
our setting. Part of the positive correlation ψ may be explained by influential users’ higher propensity to
share.
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Fig. 6: Simulated relative risks of adoption for active versus passive sharing. 500 iterations were
used, each with a set of parameters drawn from the estimated posterior distributions. Dyad selection
comprises the bulk of the selection effect in most cases and the mechanisms are complementary.
The confidence intervals on the total relative risk are larger than those we report earlier because
they incorporate model uncertainty.
population of adopters. Our results suggest that the decision to share enhances efficiency of
diffusion by increasing the probability of adoption for downstream users. Thus when users
can choose to share, there are fewer wasted exposures generated in the diffusion process.
From a design perspective, our results show that while encouraging users to share their
behaviors may increase the total number of adoptions, it can have negative consequences.
There exists a tradeoff for platform providers for whom distribution is a scarce resource or
brands using costly incentive strategies to improve rates of peer exposure.
In our experimental setup, either active or passive sharing distributed adoption stories
through an automated content ranking system, exposing a potentially large audience to
identical messages. In other settings, the audience and message resulting from an adopter’s
sharing decision may be more variable. Adopters may decide how many peers they share
with, with whom they share, and what exactly they choose to say when they share. It
is possible that giving adopters tighter control over the outcome from sharing could yield
stronger selection effects than we observed, resulting in higher adoption rates.
Our parameter estimates also seem to suggest a potential explanation for why campaigns
rarely “go viral” [Bakshy et al. 2011; Goel et al. 2012]. In order to propagate through a
network, a product must be adopted and shared at a high rate. In Facebook Offers, we found
that product-level factors which predict adoption and sharing are only mildly correlated and
explain only a small fraction of the variance in spreading behaviors. It may simply be rare
to find examples of products which contribute high levels of sharing and adoption utility to
all users.
6.1. Limitations and Future Work
While we are able to plausibly observe users’ interactions with respect to sharing and
claiming Offers comprehensively, we are bound to investigate selection effects that occur via
plausible changes to Facebook’s existing delivery mechanisms. For Facebook users, sharing
means publishing content to a specified audience – often friends – so that the content appears
in friends’ News Feeds. Like face-to-face situations, the likelihood of receiving information
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via the Feed is determined by an individual’s preferences and previous interactions. Thus,
it is possible that Facebook’s feed ranking algorithm automatically plays some selective role
in the diffusion of Offers. It is possible that other platforms, especially those which do not
use ranking, to exhibit even stronger sharing selection effects.
We used a randomized field experiment to estimate selection effects in the sharing process
for single individuals and their peers. Since selection effects may compound over several steps
of the diffusion process, it is possible that individual-level effects may differ for subjects had
the experiment randomized over Offers. Furthermore, passive sharing is likely to increase
the number of social signals an individual receives. As discussed in Section 4.2, multiply-
exposed peers may behave differently, and we might also expect that overall macro effects
would be different under other randomization schemes. While our experiment is designed
specifically to estimate peer effects not caused by multiple reinforcing signals, examining
how these different effects interact would be of substantial interest from a policy perspective.
There are also a number of other opportunities for further exploration. In our setting,
adoption and sharing decisions were relatively costless for the subjects, requiring only a
single touch on a mobile phone. It would be interesting to see if these results apply for more
costly settings where adoption comes at some expense. Other types of encouragements to
sharing could be explored, such as monetary incentives, which could generate smoother
variation in the rate of sharing. Finally, other peer outcomes, such as using the Offer in
brick-and-mortar stores, are also of great interest.
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